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Amended Rules, Amended Pleadings:
How the Abrogation of Form 18
Politicized Direct Infringement
Patent Pleading
ABSTRACT

Since the abrogationof Form 18, the template for pleadingdirect
infringement of patents, district courts have struggled to assess exactly
what a plaintiff must assert in pleadings to survive a motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim. In place of FederalRule of Civil Procedure
84, courts have developed multiple standards to assess pleading
sufficiency. The US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has
provided little guidance when given the opportunity to resolve this
division, leaving uncertainty for litigants andjudges.
Using data collected from opinions on motions to dismiss during
2016 and 2017, this Note identifies a significant amount of granted
motions in the period immediately following abrogation. Further, the
datasuggests thatjudges appointed by Republicanpresidentshave used
stricter pleading standards, and are more likely to grant a motion to
dismiss, than judges appointed by Democraticpresidents. As a result,
this Note argues for a uniform pleading standard that restricts the
ability to politicize infringementpleadings, works to provide consistency
and predictabilityfor litigants, and complies with the Supreme Court's
teachings in Bell Atlantic v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal.
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On November 30, 2015, the United States set a record for patent
lawsuits filed in a single day, with 257 cases filed in district courts
throughout the country.' This surge highlighted a busy fourth quarter
for patent litigators, where courts witnessed the filing of 1,570 patent

1.

Jeff John Roberts, Patent Lawsuits Set One-Day Record with 257 New Cases, Most

Filed in Texas, FORTUNE (Dec. 2, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/12/02/patent-lawsuit-record/

[https://perma.cc/HY67-P3SU].
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infringement cases (847 of which were filed in November alone). 2 By
comparison, the third quarter of 2015 and first quarter of 2016 saw
1,113 and 962 infringement suits filed, respectively.3 At first glance, it
may appear that patentees were simply eager to file during the fourth
quarter to beat the holiday rush. Many, however, are linking this
litigation spike to the abrogation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
(FRCP) 84 and Form 18, which entered into effect on December 1, 2015
as part of the 2015 amendments to the FRCP. 4 This abrogation
removed the bright-line pleading standard for direct infringement and
tasked courts with determining whether plaintiffs sufficiently pled a
claim for relief under FRCP 8 and FRCP 12.5
During the last two years, courts have struggled to effectively
apply these new pleading standards to direct infringement claims.
Between December 2015 and November 2016, courts granted 44
percent of motions challenging the sufficiency of pleadings for failure to
state a claim under FRCP 12(b)(6). 6 Since the abrogation of Form 18 in
2015, patentees and courts have struggle d to determine how to apply
recent case law and decisions to patent pleading standards. To date, at
least four distinctive, commonly used pleading standards have emerged
in the district courts. Given the surrounding uncertainty, patentees
risk heightened litigation costs and repeated amended complaints if
they fail to properly interpret and apply what may appear as an
arbitrary standard when drafting complaints. 7 Further, unless a
plaintiff elects to appeal rather than amend their deficient complaint,
the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit does not get the
opportunity to review the applied pleading standard.8 This has proven

Steve Brachman, Lex Machina Litigation Report Shows 22% Drop in Patent
2.
2017),
(Jan.
17,
IP
WATCHDOG
2016,
Suits
for
Infringement
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/01/17/lex-machina-litigation-report-drop-patent-infringementsuits-2016id=77108/ [https://perma.ce/3XSB-T5H3].
Id.
3.
4.
See, e.g., id.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a) ("A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain: ... a
5.
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.. . ."); FED. R.
CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
Christian E. Mammen, Update on Pleading Standards in Patent Cases, 24 NO. 6
6.
WESTIAW J. INTELL. PROP. 1, 2 (2017).
7.
See AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. IAw ASS'N, 2015 REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY
https://www.aipla.org/detail/journal-issue/2015-report-of-the-economic-survey
(2015),
[https://perma.cclCR8W-B85L] (noting the average cost of patent litigation prior to trial ranges
from $400,000 in lawsuits where less than $1 million is at risk, to almost $3 million in lawsuits
where over $25 million is at risk).
8.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2018) (requiring a final decision from the district courts before
appellate courts are granted jurisdiction).
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exceedingly rare, as the Federal Circuit has only-reviewed a handful of
decisions regarding pleading sufficiency since 2015.9
This Note provides a comprehensive review of direct
infringement pleading standards since the abrogation of FRCP 84 and
Form 18 in 2015. Part II begins by summarizing the history of and
relevant case law on these standards, paying special attention to
developments following the Supreme Court's decisions in Bell Atlantic
Corporationv. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal.0 Part II concludes with
a summary of the four most common pleading standards district courts
use when assessing whether a pleading is sufficient, as well as a brief
discussion of other pleading standards adopted by courts not applying
one of these four standards. Part III examines the limited Federal
Circuit jurisprudence on pleading standards before discussing how each
pleading standard relates to Twombly, Iqbal, and traditional patent law
policy. Part IV analyzes these pleading standards using over one
hundred district court patent cases since the abrogation of FRCP 84,
with the goal of determining what trends, if any, have emerged since
the abrogation of Form 18. This Note concludes by arguing in favor of
a single consistent claim pleading standard, independent of the claim's
technology, that satisfies both patent policy objectives and the
heightened pleading standards in Twombly and Iqbal.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Pre-Twombly: Patent Pleading Under FRCP84 and Form 18
FRCP 84 was enacted in 1938 as part of the original Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure." The Advisory Committee noted that the
purpose of the rule was to prevent confusion when applying FRCP 8,
which governs pleading standards.1 2 At the time of its enactment, the
text of FRCP 84 was simple, stating that "[t]he forms contained in the
Appendix of Forms are intended to indicate, subject to the provisions of
these rules, the simplicity and brevity of statement which the rules
contemplate." 3 Among these original forms was Form 18, which

See infra Section IIIA.
9.
10.
See generally Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544 (2007).
11.
FED. R. Civ. P. 84 (2014) (abrogated 2015).
12.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 84 advisory committee's note to 1946 amendment (2015) (abrogated
2015) (citing Walter W. Cook, "Facts" and "Statements of Fact," 4 U. CHI. L. REV. 233, 245-46
(1936)) ("'[P]leaders in the federal courts are not to be left to guess as to the meaning of [the]

language' in Rule 8(a) regarding the form of the complaint .... 'All of which is as it should be. In
no other way can useless litigation be avoided.').
13.
FED. R. CIV. P. 84 (1938) (amended 1946) (amended 2007) (abrogated 2015).
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governed direct patent infringement pleading requirements. Form 18
was unassuming and required, in addition to a statement of
jurisdiction, that the plaintiff merely (1) identify the patent number and
invention at issue; (2) identify the potentially infringing party and
product; and (3) certify that it has provided notice to the defendant of
the potential infringement.1 4 This notice pleading standard governed
patent infringement pleadings for almost eighty years.' 5
Proponents of Form 18 lauded its simplicity because it reduced
the barriers to entering the courtroom and to filing pretrial motionstherefore reducing litigation over pleading ambiguity. 16 Supreme Court
opinions periodically reinforce the notion that patent litigation is
important, noting that a strong public interest exists in ensuring that
statutorily unpatentable ideas are not improperly monopolized.' 7 Form
18's simplicity provided a low hurdle into the courtroom, allowing the
public to police patents through litigation.' 8 Critics argued the barrier
to the courtroom was set too low, thus enabling patent trolls 9 to take
advantage of the system and file information-deprived complaints in
the hope of forcing a settlement, which ultimately bogged down district
courts and increased discovery costs in the process.2 0
B. Post-Twombly: Direct Infringement Pleading
Starting in 2007, the Supreme Court addressed pleading
sufficiency in light of FRCP 12(b)(6) 21 in two landmark cases. In Bell
See FED. R. Civ. P. Form 18 (2014) (abrogated 2015).
14.
15.
Andrew L. Milam, Note, PleadingPatent Infringement:Res Ipsa Loquitur as a Guide,
59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 301, 308 (2017).
See Leeron Morad & Andrew Bramhall, 3 Potential Consequences of Losing Rule 84
16.
and the Forms, LAW360 (June 24, 2015), https://www.law360.com/articles/665511/3-potentialconsequences-of-losing-rule-84-and-the-forms [https://perma.cc/S4TL-LJRH] (noting that Form 18
created a uniform pleading standard and its demise is likely to encourage forum shopping).
17.
See, e.g., Medtronic, Inc. v. Mirowski Family Ventures, LLC, 571 U.S. 191, 203 (2014)
(quoting Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Machinery Co., 324 U.S. 806,
816 (1945)) ("The public interest, of course, favors the maintenance of a well-functioning patent
system. But the 'public' also has a 'paramount interest in seeing that patent monopolies ... are
kept within their legitimate scope.' (alteration in original)).
See, e.g., MedImmune, Inc., v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 137 (2007); Lear, Inc. v.
18.
Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 655-56 (1969).
19.
For more about patent trolls, see generally John M. Golden, "PatentTrolls"andPatent
Remedies, 85 TEX. L. REv. 2111 (2007); Edward Lee, Patent Trolls: Moral Panics, Motions in
Limine, and PatentReform, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 113 (2015).
Milam, supra note 15, at 312-13; see also Elliot Harmon, Form 18 Is Dead. What's
20.
Next
for Patent Trolls?, ELECTRONIC
FRONTIER
FOUND.
(Dec.
2,
2015),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2015/12/form-18-dead-whats-next-patent-trolls [https://perma.cc/
HRY8-MLNF] (noting the cost of discovery for corporate defendants, with extensive servers,
experts, and employees, often greatly exceeds that of patent trolls, who usually have fewer
employees and documents).
21.
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) ("[F]ailure to state a claim upon which relief can be
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Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, the government brought antitrust claims
against Bell Atlantic, asserting that stray remarks made by Bell
Atlantic were sufficient to state a plausible claim of anticompetitive
behavior.2 2 The Court disagreed, holding that the alleged behavior in
the complaint did not create a plausible claim.2 3 While FRCP 8 requires
only a short and plain statement showing the plaintiff is entitled to
relief, FRCP 12(b)(6) requires sufficient facts to raise the right to relief
above a speculative level. 24 The Court cited the high costs of antitrust
litigation when noting that this pleading standard protects against
frivolous lawsuits and costly discovery when the plaintiff is unlikely to
be entitled to relief.25 This policy reasoning likewise applies to patent
litigation, where costs can exceed $1 million for each side. 26
If any doubt as to the pleading standard existed, the Court
clarified its Twombly holding in Ashcroft v. Iqbal.27 The Court held that
Iqbal pled insufficient facts to plausibly support his Bivens action
against numerous federal officials. 28
In the process, the Court
attempted to clarify what information was necessary to survive a
motion to dismiss. 29 The Court stated that plausible claims must
contain sufficient factual content to "allow[] the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged."3" The decision articulated a two-pronged approach by which
courts should (1) identify and separate pleadings of fact from legal
conclusions and (2) evaluate the pleadings of fact to determine whether
"they plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief."3 1
In light of Twombly and Iqbal, Form 18 soon came under fire for
failing to meet the Court's heightened pleading standards. In 2013,

granted. . . .").
22.
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 564-65 (2007).
23.
Id. at 566.
24.
FED. R. CIV. P. 8 ("A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain[| ... a short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . .. ."); see also
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
25.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558-59.
26.
See AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW AsS'N, supra note 7. Although the total cost of
patent litigation fell in 2017, the median trial cost was $800,000 when less than $1 million was at
stake, and $1.7 million when between $1 million and $10 million was at stake. See Malathi Nayak,
Cost of Patent Infringement Litigation Falling Sharply, PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA)
No. 154 (Aug. 11, 2017).
27.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 668-69 (2009).
28.
Id. at 687.
29.
Id. at 678 ("Rule 8 ... does not require 'detailed factual allegations,' but it demands
more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation. A pleading that offers
'labels and conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.'"
(citations omitted)).
30.
Id.
31.
Id. at 679-81.
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Congress proposed several bills that called for heightened pleading
standards to combat patent trolls.32 Prior to these congressional
proposals, the Federal Circuit came to Form 18's defense through
several cases in the years following Twombly and Iqbal.3 3 The strongest
defense came in In Re Bill of Lading, where the Federal Court relied on
the Advisory Committee notes and precedent to find the sufficiency of
In K-Tech
decisions.3 4
recent
the
18
survived
Form
Telecommunications, Inc. v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., the Federal
Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of the plaintiffs claim,
finding that while the requirements of Form 18 were not a particularly
high pleading standard, they still satisfied FRCP 8.35 In each of these
decisions, the Federal Circuit upheld seventy years of precedent by
attempting to reconcile the heightened pleading standard set forth in
Twombly and Iqbal with the seemingly primitive requirements of Form
18 by relying on various passages of the FRCP and accompanying
Advisory Committee notes. More recent decisions have declined to
answer whether a difference exists between Form 18 and the
Twombly/Iqbal standard. 36
Judges and scholars have criticized these contradicting
standards and called for various reforms, including the end of Form
38
18,3 a separate patent pleading regime, the use of Form 18 as a mere
39
context-specific illustration, or the dismissal of complaints that "do
not guide the course of discovery."4o Jonathan Moore notes that
See, e.g., Patent Abuse Reduction Act of 2013, S. 1013, 113th Cong. (2013). Scholars
32.
were generally supportive of these proposed laws. See, e.g., Arjun Rangaraj an, PleadingPatents:
Predictingthe Outcome of Statutorily Heightening PleadingStandards, 13 DUKE L. & TECH. REV.
195, 196 (2015).
See, e.g., K-Tech Telecomms., Inc., v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., 714 F.3d 1277, 1284
33.
(Fed. Cir. 2013); In re Bill of Lading Transmission & Processing Sys. Patent Litig., 681 F.3d 1323,
1334 (Fed. Cir. 2012); McZeal v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 501 F.3d 1354, 1356-57 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
In re Bill of Lading, 681 F.3d at 1334 ("[A] pleading, motion, or other paper that follows
34.
one of the official forms cannot be successfully attacked." (citation omitted)); see also Leatherman
v. Tarrant Cty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993) ("[A]ny
changes to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 'must be obtained by the process of amending the
Federal Rules, and not by judicial interpretation.'); FED. R. CIv. P. 84 (2014) (abrogated 2015).
K-Tech, 714 F.3d at 1283, 1287 ("[To the extent any conflict exists
35.
between Twombly (and its progeny) and the Forms regarding pleadings requirements, the Forms
control.").
Disc Disease Sols. Inc., v. VGH Sols., Inc., 888 F.3d 1256, 1259 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2018);
36.
Nalco Co. v. Chem-Mod, LLC, 883 F.3d 1337, 1347 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
See McZeal, 501 F.3d at 1362 (Dyk, J., dissenting).
37.
Jonathan L. Moore, ParticularizingPatent Pleading:PleadingPatent Infringement in
38.
a Post-Twombly World, 18 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 451, 493-95 (2010).
See Andrew C. Michaels, An Infamous Illustrationof Patent Infringement Pleading:
39.
Form 18 and Context-Specificity, 19 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 286, 304-05 (2013).
See Adam Steinmetz, Note, PleadingPatent Infringement: Applying the Standard
40.
Establishedby Twombly and Iqbal to the Patent Context, 13 COLUM. Sci. & TECH. L. REV. 482, 51617 (2012).
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regardless of the impact of Twombly and Iqbal, Form 18 had not been
significantly revised since 1938-an era characterized by notice
pleading,4 ' lack of a Federal Circuit, and limited patent rights. 42 Few
argued for the status quo after the Court's decisions in Twombly and

Iqbal.
C. 2015 Amendments: The Fallof FRCP84 and Form 18
The Supreme Court abrogated FRCP 84 and Form 18 in the 2015
Amendments to the FRCP, after almost eighty years in existence.? On
November 30, 2015, the final day before the abrogation of Form 18,
litigants set a record for most infringement suits filed in district courts
around the country."
When abrogating FRCP 84, the Advisory
Committee noted that illustrations of the rules were no longer
necessary in light of sufficient examples in libraries and websites, and
clarified that the abrogation does not impact existing pleading
standards or the requirements of FRCP 8.45 Since then, the Supreme
Court has remained silent on the replacement standard for Form 18,
and the Federal Circuit has issued few opinions that address the
matter. 6 In lieu of firm appellate guidance, scholars have proposed
various methods to reform patent pleading.47
D. District Court Pleading StandardsAfter the Abrogation of FRCP 84
Without specific direction on direct infringement pleading
standards from the Federal Circuit or the Supreme Court, district
courts were left to interpret post-Form 18 pleadings in light of Twombly
and Iqbal.4 8
Among those courts now applying Twombly/Iqbal

41.
See, e.g., Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1957).
42.
See Moore, supranote 38, at 498-99.
43.
FED. R. CIV. P. 84 advisory committee's note to 2015 abrogation (2015) (abrogated
2015) ("The purpose of providing illustrations for the rules, although useful when the rules were
adopted, has been fulfilled. Accordingly ... Rule 84 and the Appendix of Forms are no longer
necessary and have been abrogated.").
44.
Roberts, supra note 1.
45.
FED. R. CIV. P. 84 advisory committee's note to 2015 abrogation (2015) (abrogated
2015).
46.
See, e.g., Lyda v. CBS Corp., 838 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
47.
See, e.g., Megan M. La Belle, The Local Rules of Patent Procedure,47 ARIz. ST. L.J. 63,
68 (2015); Jun Zheng, A New Era for Patent Infringement Pleading: Twombly, Iqbal, and the
Demise of Form 18, 24 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 15, 32 (2016) (arguing that a patent pleading
different from the standard in other civil suits is inappropriate in light of the spirit of Iqbal).
48.
See, e.g., Gracenote, Inc. v. Sorenson Media, Inc., No. 2:16-CV-950 CW, 2017 WL
2116173, at *2 (D. Utah May 15, 2017) ("Although the Federal Circuit has not yet addressed
whether Twombly and Iqbal pleading standards now apply to direct patent infringement claims,
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pleading, most begin with the baseline assertion that a plaintiff must
plead each and every element of an asserted claim to adequately plead
infringement. 49 However, the extent to which courts require this
element varies.5o As a result, four common standards informally
emerged as courts attempted to interpret Twombly and Iqbal's
requirements as applied to direct infringement pleading. 5 ' These four
standards are described below-from most heightened to leastfollowed by a discussion of other pleading standards that do not align
with one of the four defined standards.
1. "Each Claim" Pleading
At the strictest end of the spectrum is the "each claim" pleading.
Applying this pleading standard, courts require a plaintiff to allege
facts sufficient to show infringement of each element of each asserted
In Asghari-Kamrani v. United Services Automobile
claim. 52
Association, the patentee sued for infringement of several claims of a
single patent for a system improving e-commerce transaction security.53
The district court found that the plaintiffs complaint insufficiently
identified how Claim 1 of the patent was infringed, and the complaint
lacked details beyond mere identification of the remaining potentially

the inference from Bill of Lading and case law since the amendments strongly suggest that they

do.-).
See LifeNet Health v. LifeCell Corp., 837 F.3d 1316, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing Cross
49.
Med. Prods., Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 424 F.3d 1293, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2005)) ("Direct
infringement of an apparatus claim 'requires that each and every limitation set forth in a claim
appear in an accused product."); Sunrise Techs., Inc., v. Cimcon Lighting, Inc., 219 F. Supp. 3d
260, 263 (D. Mass. 2016) (citing Southwall Techs., Inc. v. Cardinal IG Co., 54 F.3d 1570, 1575 (Fed.
Cir. 1995)) ("To succeed on a claim for direct infringement, the allegedly infringing product must
practice all elements of a patent claim."). But see Crypto Research, LLC v. Assa Abloy, Inc., 236 F.
Supp. 3d 671, 686 (E.D.N.Y. 2017) ("1 decline to require that the plaintiff plead direct infringement
of each and every element of the allegedly infringed claims.").
Compare Oil-Dri Corp. of Am. v. Nestle Purina Petcare Co., No. 15-CV-1067, 2017 WL
50.
1197096, at *5 (N.D. Il. Mar. 31, 2017) ("It makes little sense that a plaintiff could plead
infringement as to one patent claim and then proceed in the litigation with respect to every other
materially different claim in the patent. Such a result sidesteps Twombly and Iqbal's plausibility
requirements."), with Wright's Well Control Servs., LLC v. Oceaneering Int'l, Inc., No. CV 15-1720,
2017 WL 568781, at *5 (E.D. La. Feb. 13, 2017) ("[The Court finds that Twombly and Iqbalrequire
plaintiffs to allege facts showing that an accused product contains each and every limitation or
element of at least one patented claim.").
See Paul R. Gugliuzza, Quick Decisions in Patent Cases, 106 GEO. L.J. 619, 664-66
51.
(2018); Michelle Callaghan, Patent Infringement Pleading StandardsSince the Abrogation of Rule
84
and Form
18:
A
Year
in
Review,
IPWATCHDOG
(Dec.
27,
2016),
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2016/12/27/patent-infringement-pleading-standards-rule-84-form18/id=76173/ [https*/perma.ce/S84P-W99E].
See e.g., Oil-Dri Corp. of Am., 2017 WL 1197096, at *5; Thermolife Intl, LLC v.
52.
Vitamin Shoppe, Inc., No. 0:16-CV-60693, 2016 WL 6678525, at *2 (S.D. Fla. June 8, 2016).
Asghari-Kamrani v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, No. 2:15CV478, 2016 WL 1253533, at
53.
*1 (E.D. Va. Mar. 22, 2016).
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infringing claims.5 4 The court granted the defendant's motion to
dismiss with respect to all claims because each element of every claim
was not sufficiently asserted.5 5
To illustrate, consider a hypothetical claim for a sundae
contained within U.S. Patent No. 9,999,999,999.
Illustration 1
demonstrates this hypothetical.
Illustration 1. Each Claim Pleading Hypothetical
Claim 1: A dessert comprising the following ingredients:one
scoop of vanilla ice cream, hot fudge sauce, whipped cream, a
donut, and a cherry, wherein the ice cream is placed on top of the
donut, the hot fudge and whipped cream on top of the ice cream,
and the cherry placed at the apex of the whipped cream.
Under the each claim pleading standard, a plaintiff would have
to plead sufficient facts in the complaint that the infringing product was
a dessert that comprised (1) vanilla ice. cream, (2) hot fudge sauce, (3)
whipped cream, (4) a donut, and (5) a cherry, and that (6) the elements
were arranged in the manner specified. Thus, one attempting to assert
infringement of a complex patent, often containing dozens of claims,
would be required to plead sufficient facts to allege infringement of each
element of every claim. 56

For complex electronics or pharmaceutical

patents, this may require a lengthy complaint to satisfy this pleading
standard.
2. "At Least One Claim" Pleading
More lenient courts have interpreted the heightened pleading
standard to only require that all elements of at least one patent claim
in the complaint are satisfied.5 7 This pleading standard lowers the
burden slightly by permitting a plaintiff to pursue infringement of

54.
Id. at *4 ("Although Plaintiffs identified several infringed claims at the outset of their
complaint, they only provide details-themselves insufficient-about how the features of the
website infringe claim 1. Plaintiffs must detail how each claim is infringed.").
Id.
55.
For most motions analyzed in this study, judges who apply the each claim pleading
56.
standard and find some claims sufficiently pled but not others dismissed the infringement claims
only with respect to the claims insufficiently pled, not the entire complaint. See, e.g., Werteks
Closed Joint Stock Co. v. GNC Corp., No. 16-60688-CIV-MORENO, 2016 WL 8809716, at *1 (S.D.
Fla. Aug. 23, 2016).
57.
Sunrise Techs., Inc. v. Cimcon Lighting, Inc., 219 F. Supp. 3d 260, 263 (D. Mass. 2016).
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multiple claims while only pleading sufficient facts for one of the
claims.-8
Hence, if U.S. Patent No. 9,999,999,999 also included three more
dependent claims, a court would need to decide if additional elements
must be pled in a direct infringement suit or if "at least one claim"
pleading is sufficient. Illustration 2 demonstrates this hypothetical.
Illustration 2. At Least One Claim Pleading Hypothetical
Claim 2: The dessert of claim 1, wherein said scoop of ice
cream is chocolate.
Claim 3: The dessert of claim 1, wherein said donut
includes frosting.
Claim 4: The dessert of claim 1 further comprising:caramel
sauce, chopped bananas, and crushed cookies, wherein these
ingredientsare situated between the ice cream and whipped cream.
Under the each claim pleading standard discussed in
Illustration 1, the plaintiff would need to allege more facts in the
complaint to satisfy each and every element of Claim 2 through Claim
4.69 Under the at least one claim pleading standard, a plaintiff who has
pled sufficient facts to show infringement of Claim 1 would be permitted
to allege infringement of Claims 2 through 4 without additional facts.
3. "Unique Feature" Pleading
Some courts have established a standard even more relaxed
than the at least one claim pleading standard, instead looking to unique
features of the patented invention to determine sufficiency of the
pleadings. 60 Under this pleading standard, a plaintiff must merely
plead that the allegedly infringing product and the patented product
share a unique feature. 61 In Iron Gate Security v. Lowe's Corp., the
plaintiff pled that the alleged infringing product, a Smart Home
Management System, used a transducer and controller to communicate
Id.
58.
See Thermolife Int'l, LLC v. Vitamin Shoppe, Inc., No. 0:16-cv-60693-UU, 2016 WL
59.
6678525, at *5 (S.D. Fla. June 8, 2016) (dismissing complaint of infringement of dependent claims
even though independent claim was sufficiently pled).
60.
Iron Gate Sec., Inc. v. Lowe's Cos., No. 15-cv-8814(SAS), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34061,
at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2016) ("Allegations that plead that 'a specific product ... allegedly
infringes [the] patent by virtue of certain specific characteristics' meet the Iqbal plausibility
standard. A plaintiff is not required to list which of the claims in the patent have been infringed
in its pleading[] . . . ." (third alteration added) (emphasis added)); see also Regeneron Pharm., Inc.
v. Merus B.V., No. 14-cv-1650(KBF), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84297, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. June 18, 2014).
Iron Gate Sec., Inc., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34061, at *8.
61.
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with a network, as taught by the patent-in-suit. 62 The defendant's
motion to dismiss was denied because the incorporated elements were
unique features of the allegedly infringed claims. 63 Notably, the court
cited In re Bill of Lading in its reasoning.64
In the case of U.S. Patent No. 9,999,999,999, merely pleading
that the infringer sold a sundae with a donut at the bottom-an
arguably unique feature-would be sufficient to survive a motion to
dismiss under this pleading standard, even if the other elements of the
claim were not sufficiently pled in the complaint.
4. Form 18 Pleading
At the other end of the spectrum are district courts holding that
Form 18, although formally repealed, still exists in spirit.65 In
Hologram USA, Inc. v. Pulse Evolution Corp., the court cited K-Tech
and the Advisory Committee notes to find that the pleading standards
had not changed despite the abrogation." The Form 18 pleading
standard ignores the heightened standards established in Twombly and
Iqbal. This approach provides increased public policing of the patent
system, as Form 18 pleading creates the lowest barrier to entry for
litigation and subsequent review of patent validity. 67
Under the aforementioned illustrations, a plaintiff could survive
a motion to dismiss by simply completing Form 18.68 Illustration 3
demonstrates this hypothetical.
Illustration 3. Form 18 Pleading Hypothetical
On December 31, 2014 United States Letters Patent No.
9,999,999.999 was issued to the plaintiff for an invention in a
sundae dessert. The plaintiff owned the patent throughout the
period of the defendant's infringing acts and still owns the patent.
The defendant has infringed and is still infringing the
Letters Patent by making, selling, and using sundae desserts that

62.
Id. at *9.
63.
See id. at *11-12.
64.
Id. at *8 n.27.
65.
Hologram USA, Inc. v. Pulse Evolution Corp., No. 2:14-cv-0772-GMN-NJK, 2016 WL
199417, at *1 n.1 (D. Nev. Jan. 15, 2016) (noting that the abrogation of Rule 84 does not alter
existing pleading standards, and Form 18 is an existing pleading standard).
66.
Id. at *1 n.1, *2.
67.
See Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 670 (1969).
68.
FED. R. CIV. P. form 18 (2014) (abrogated 2015). Underlined sections are blank in the
generic version of the form but are filled in here for illustration. Id.
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embody the patented invention, and the defendant will continue to
do so unless enjoined by this court.
The plaintiff has complied with the statutory requirement
of placing a notice of the Letters Patent on all sundae desserts it
manufactures and sells and has given the defendant written notice
of the infringement.
5. Other Pleading
Finally, some courts have resisted rigid pleading standards
when ruling on the sufficiency of pleadings, instead opting to apply the
guidance offered in Twombly and Iqbal on a case-by-case basis. The
Eastern District of Texas, a traditionally pro-plaintiff district, favors
this approach. 69 This approach creates subjectivity and can lead to
unpredictable results, but its flexibility may benefit unique situations
or technologies.7 0
The above illustrations, although fictional, highlight the vast
differences between the various pleading standards established by the
district courts. Until the Federal Circuit clarifies these varying
standards, attorneys will be faced with pleading standards that vary
from case to case and district to district.
II. AN ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL CIRCUIT JURISPRUDENCE AND PATENT
POLICY
It is clear that district courts continue to struggle with applying
a consistent pleading standard for direct infringement pleading, which
has led to high rates of dismissals,7 ' amended complaints,7 2 and longer

See, e.g., PanOptis Patent Mgmt., LLC v. Blackberry Corp., No. 2:16-CV-00059-JRG69.
RSP, 2017 WL 780885, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 10, 2017) ("It is not necessary, however, to announce
a floor for the direct infringement pleading standard in this case because PanOptis's allegations
satisfy the Lyda and Iqbal/Twombly standards.").
This subjectivity is particularly well observed in two cases decided by same judge
70.
within two weeks of one another, which came out different ways. Compare LBS Innovations, LLC
v. Nokia USA Inc., No. 2:15-cv-1972-JRG, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80303, at *6 (E.D. Tex. June 21,
2016) (quoting language from Ashcroft v. Iqbal regarding a context-specific inquiry when finding
complaint insufficiently pled), with Solocron Educ., LLC v. Healthstream, Inc., No. 2:16-cv-16JRG, 2016 WL 9137458, at *3 (E.D. Tex. June 7, 2016) (finding complaint sufficiently pled using
roughly the same language: "While the abrogation of Form 18 does not require plaintiffs to
augment their complaints with element-by-element infringement contentions, claims for direct
infringement must nevertheless satisfy the pleadings standards set forth by the Supreme Court
in Twombly and Iqbal," and noting that "[d]etermining whether a complaint states a claim for
infringement is a very 'context specific task').
71.
See Mammen, supra note 6, at 2.
72.
See, e.g., Artrip v. Ball Corp., No. 1:14CV00014, 2017 WL 3669518, at *5, *10 (W.D.
Va. Aug. 24, 2017) (granting motion to dismiss but permitting plaintiff to file a third amended
complaint).
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trials. 7 3 The subjectivity inherent in the Twombly/Iqbal pleading
standard has proven especially difficult to predict in patent litigation.
When the Federal Circuit inevitably steps in, the panel will likely
consider the effect of an explicit pleading standard on patent policy,
including the effect on public policing of the patent system7 4 and
whether a rigid pleading standard is needed to avoid frivolous lawsuits
by patent trolls. This Part addresses each point in turn.
A. Has the Federal Circuit Tipped Its Hand?
The Federal Circuit has come close to resolving this issue, as it
occasionally handles pleading sufficiency when complaints are
dismissed with prejudice. A review of post-Form 18 decisions can shed
light on the stance the Federal Circuit is likely to take when it resolves
this issue.
1. 2016: Lyda v. CBS Corp.
In Lyda v. CBS Corp., the inventor's complaint, which was filed
before the abrogation of FRCP 84 and Form 18, relied entirely on Form
18 when pleading joint infringement.7 5 The district court dismissed
under FRCP 12(b)(6), and the Federal Circuit affirmed, noting that joint
infringement is not governed by Form 18 and that absent a controlling
form, the Twombly/Iqbal pleading standard would apply.7 6 By making
this distinction between joint and direct infringement, the Federal
Circuit left the issue of a pleading standard for direct infringement for
another day. Further, the court noted that its reasoning in Lyda was
not applicable to the abrogation of Form 18 because the complaint was
filed before December 1, 2015, the date Form 18 was abrogated." The
Federal Circuit panel unanimously held that because joint
infringement requires additional elements not addressed in Form 18,78

73.
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS (PWC), 2017 PATENT LITIGATION STUDY 7 (2017),
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/2017-Patent-Litigation-StudyPwC.pdf
[https//perma.cc/FJK2-BPRR] (noting the median time-to-trial in patent cases has steadily

increased to almost 2.5 years).
74.
See Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 670 (1969); Woods v. City of Greensboro, 855
F.3d 639, 652 (4th Cir. 2017) ("Manifestly, the rule of Iqbal/Twombly was not intended to serve
as a federal court door-closing mechanism for arguably weak cases.. ..
75.
Lyda v. CBS Corp., 838 F.3d 1331, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
76.
Id. at 1339.
77.
Id. at 1337 n.2.
78.
Id. at 1338 ("To prove joint infringement, where multiple actors are involved in
practicing the claim steps, the patent owner must show that the acts of one party are attributable
to the other such that a single entity is responsible for the infringement.").
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sufficient pleading of induced infringement requires satisfying the
Twombly/Iqbal pleading standards, not those of Form 18.7
But since there can be no induced infringement unless direct
infringement is present,8 0 does it logically follow that the pleading
standard for direct infringement is no more demanding (and maybe less
so) than what the court spelled out in Lyda?8 ' The Federal Circuit's
decision seems to suggest so. 82 However, the court notably withheld
judgement on this specific issue, despite an extensive discussion on its
prior Form 18 jurisprudence and subsequent direct infringement
pleading requirements.8 3
2. 2017: Lifetime Industries, Inc. v. Trim-Lock, Inc.
The Federal Circuit provided further clarification on direct
infringement pleading standards in Lifetime Industries, Inc. v. TrimLok, Inc.8 4 In a lengthy discussion on this issue, Judge Lourie
acknowledged the abrogation of Form 18 but declined to answer
whether there exists a difference between Form 18 and Twombly/Iqbal
pleading standards.8 5 The Federal Circuit then reversed the lower
court's ruling, finding that Lifetime's complaint had sufficiently pled an
allegation of direct infringement. 86 While Judge Lourie did not
establish a minimum pleading standard required to survive a motion to
dismiss and resolve this district court split, he expressed concerns over
requiring too much detail at the pleading stage.8 7 This may suggest
that some of the stricter pleading standards discussed in Section I.D
may be disfavored if reviewed by an appellate panel. However, Judge
Lourie failed to address the minimum pleading standard required to

79.
Id. at 1339.
Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Techs., Inc., 572 U.S. 915, 924 (2014).
80.
See Lyda, 838 F.3d at 1339 ("Because joint infringement requires additional elements
81.
not addressed by Form 18, we hold that allegations of joint infringement must be measured by the
Iqbal and Twombly standard without reference to Form 18." (emphasis added)).
82.
Id. ("Therefore, like claims of induced or contributory infringement, allegations of joint
infringement require elements beyond those for the more typical act of direct infringement to
which Form 18 is directed.").
Id. at 1337-38.
83.
84.
Lifetime Indus., Inc. v. Trim-Lok, Inc., 869 F.3d 1372, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
Id. at 1377 ("The parties assume that there is a difference between the requirements
85.
of Form 18 and Iqbal/Twombly; however, we have never recognized such a distinction. In any
event, we need not resolve the question whether there is a difference between the two standards
here. . . ." (citation omitted)).

86.
Id. at 1378.
87.
Id. at 1379 ("Trim-Lok's complaints concerning lack of detail ask for too much. There
is no requirement for Lifetime to'prove its case at the pleading stage.' Our precedent requires that
a complaint place the alleged infringer 'on notice of what activity ... is being accused of
infringement."' (alteration in original) (citations omitted)).
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survive a motion to dismiss, concluding the discussion of direct
infringement by noting the limited scope of the lower court's decision
prevented a more detailed review by the panel.88
3. 2018: Nalco Company v. Chem-Mod, LLC

'

The Federal Circuit's next opportunity to clarify the pleading
standard came in Nalco Company v. Chem-Mod, LLC, where the court
held in a fact-intensive opinion that the plaintiff had adequately alleged
direct infringement.8 9 As in Lifetime Industries, the court declined to
rule on Form 18's relation to minimum pleading standards.9 Rather,
the appellate panel found that the lower court incorrectly applied claim
construction principles in deciding the complaint's infringement
contentions were implausible.9
4. 2018: Disc Disease Solutions, Inc. v. VGH Solutions, Inc.
Finally, the Federal Circuit provided some clarity when it
decided Disc Disease Solutions, Inc. v. VGH Solutions, Inc. in May
2018.92 In Disc Disease, the appellate panel overturned the lower
court's dismissal with prejudice, finding that the plaintiffs complaint
sufficiently alleged that the defendant's product met "each and every
element of at least one claim of Plaintiffs patents."9 3 In a short opinion,
Judge Reyna noted that the patents at issue, which covered spinal
braces, were a simple technology consisting of only four independent
claims.9 4 In this instance, meeting the at least one claim pleading
standard through disclosures and allegations was sufficient to survive

88.
Id. ("[The limited scope of the district court's decision similarly limits our own
review. . . . Lifetime adequately alleged that Trim-Lok created an infringing combination... . We
need not, and do not, express any other opinion relating to the level of detail contained in Lifetime's
[Second Amended Complaint].").
89.
Nalco Co. v. Chem-Mod, LLC, 883 F.3d 1337, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
90.
Id. at 1347 n.2 ("We have held previously that compliance with Form 18 'effectively
immunize[d] a claimant from attack regarding the sufficiency of the pleading.' Nalco argues that
all of its complaints should have been entitled to this leeway . . . . We need not resolve this
question because, as explained below, we find Nalco's [4th Amended Complaint] sufficient under
the current version of the Federal Rules and those cases interpreting those rules." (first alteration
in original) (citations omitted)).
91.
Id. at 1350 ("It is not appropriate to resolve these disputes ... on a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion, without the benefit of claim construction. The 'purpose of a motion to dismiss is to test the
sufficiency of the complaint, not to decide the merits." (quoting Gibson v. City of Chicago, 910 F.2d
1510, 1520 (7th Cir. 1990)) (emphasis omitted)).
92.
Disc Disease Sols., Inc. v. VGH Sols., Inc., 888 F.3d 1256, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
Id.
93.
94.
Id. ('This case involves a simple technology. The asserted patents, which were
attached to the complaint, consist of only four independent claims.").
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a motion to dismiss.95 Notably, the court did not even address whether
a difference exists between Form 18 and the Twombly/Iqbal pleading
standard. 96
This new development shifts the focus of the inquiry for lower
courts. The Federal Circuit has clarified that the at least one claim
pleading standard will satisfy Twombly/Iqbal for some patents, but this
will ultimately depend on the nature and complexity of the technology.9 7
Now, courts must define what constitutes a "simple technology";
whether a heightened pleading standard is appropriate for more
complex patents; and whether Disc Disease represents a minimum
pleading floor or if an even simpler pleading requirement may be
appropriate in other cases.9 8
While attempts to predict the Federal Circuit's course have
proved futile in the past, the takeaways from these previous decisions
at the very least suggest that the Federal Circuit is likely to adopt the
Twombly/Iqbal pleading standard for direct infringement pleading if
the opportunity ever arises. But it remains unclear whether the
Federal Circuit will require anything further than Form 18's
requirements to satisfy the Twombly/Iqbal pleading standard. Judge
Lourie's recent apprehension of overstrict pleading standards in
Liftetime Industries suggests the bar may not be as high as some courts
have recently required. 99 A decision by the Federal Circuit establishing
a low-level pleading requirement (equivalent to or slightly above the
requirements of Form 18) would also fall in line with the Federal
Circuit's longstanding-but debated-reputation of being pro-patent
holder.1oo
95.
Id.
96.
Id.
Id.
97.
Disc Disease featured two patents-in-suit, which were twenty pages (with nineteen
98.
claims) and fifteen pages (with six claims), respectively. See Disc Disease Sols., Inc. v. VGH Sols.,
Inc., No. 1:15-CV-188 (LJA), 2016 WL 6561566, at *1 (M.D. Ga. Nov. 2, 2016). While the Federal
Circuit declared this a "simple technology," this term is subjective-the Author of this Note looked
at patents-in-suit that were as short as 5 pages (with only 3 claims). See Erfindergemeinschaft
Uropep GbR v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. 2:15-cv-1202-WCB, 2016 WL 1643315, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 26,
2016).
See Lifetime Indus., Inc. v. Trim-Lok, Inc., 869 F.3d 1372, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
99.
See Ryan T. Holte & Christopher B. Seaman, Patent Injunctions on Appea- An
100.
EmpiricalStudy of the FederalCircuit'sApplication of eBay, 92 WASH. L. REV. 145, 201 (2017) ("In
sum, the Federal Circuit's apparent inclination toward injunctive relief-and thus more valuable
patent rights-lends supports to the claim that the Federal Circuit has used its position as the
primary appellate court over patent claims to shape the law in a pro-patentee direction."); David
R. Pekarek Krohn & Emerson H. Tiller, Federal CircuitPatent Precedent:An Empirical Study of
InstitutionalAuthority and Intellectual Property Ideology, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 1177, 1208 (2012)
(concluding after an extensive statistical analysis that Federal Circuit precedent is relied upon by
lower courts more in pro-patent opinions). But see Molly Mosley-Goren, Jurisdictional
Gerrymandering? Responding to Holmes Group v. Vornando Air Circulation Systems, 36 J.
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B. ReconcilingPatent Policy with General PleadingStandards

'

Although the Supreme Court has recently deferred to Congress
on patent policy, it often discusses the subject in its patent opinions.' 0
The original Advisory Committee made very few comments about FRCP
8, other than relating back to the original Equity Rules from which the
rule was fashioned.1 02 However, one need not look further than FRCP
1 to see an overarching theme of balancing truth seeking and judicial
efficiency at a low reasonable cost to all parties. 03 The Supreme Court
has noted that FRCP 8's purpose is to enable courts to reach a proper
decision on the merits, and lower courts have echoed this sentiment.104
Additionally, lower courts repeatedly emphasize FRCP 8's critical
notice function to defendants, ensuring efficient preparation and
focused discovery. 05 Finally, at least one court has gone so far as to
note that FRCP 8 is intended to "prevent surprise" over which issues
are to be litigated.106
The Supreme Court clarified these purposes through its
Twombly and Iqbal opinions. In the majority opinion of Twombly,
Justice Souter expressed concerns that a complaint must raise a
"reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence" related to
alleged misconduct. 0 7 If this fails, a court should expose this deficiency
at the earliest possible opportunity. 08 The remainder of the decision
discussed the hypersensitivity of this purpose in antitrust lawsuits,

MARSHALL L. REV. 1, 51-52 (2002) ("[C]omplaints that the Federal Circuit has become a
specialized or 'pro-patent' biased court, as cautioned against in hearings on the court's creation,
appear largely unsupported . . .").
101.
See, e.g., Kimble v. Marvel Entm't, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2405 (2015).
102.
FED. R. CIV. P. 8 advisory committee's 1937 note (noting the similarities between
FRCP 8 and Equity Rules 18, 30, and 31). The Equity Rules governed Federal civil procedure from

1822 to 1938. See Thomas 0. Main, TraditionalEquity and ContemporaryProcedure, 78 WASH. L.
REV. 429, 469-71 (2003).
103.
FED. R. CIv. P. 1 ("[The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] should be construed,
administered, and employed. . . to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every
action and proceeding.").
104.
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 48 (1957) ("The Federal Rules reject the approach that
pleading is a game of skill in which one misstep by counsel may be decisive to the outcome and
accept the principle that the purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on the merits.");
see also Moustakas v. Margolis, 154 F. Supp. 3d 719, 725 (N.D. Il. 2016).
105.
See, e.g., Jones v. Kirchner, 835 F.3d 74, 80 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (finding that FRCP 8 does
not require plaintiffs to identify each relevant item and document prior to discovery); Edelman v.
Belco Title & Escrow, LLC, 754 F.3d 389, 395 (7th Cir. 2014).
106.
See Lopez v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 18 F.R.D. 59, 61 (D. Alaska 1955).
107.
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007).
108.
Id. at 558 ("[W]hen the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a
claim of entitlement to relief, 'this basic deficiency should.. . be exposed at the point of minimum
expenditure of time and money by the parties and the court.' (second alteration in original)
(citations omitted)).
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'

where the cost of discovery is often extravagant. 0 9 The same logic can
easily be applied to patent infringement discovery, where the average
cost of litigation through discovery ranges from $400,000 to $2.6
million, depending on the amount at risk." 0 Iqbal largely echoed these
sentiments, emphasizing that a court is obligated to deny costly
discovery to an insufficient complaint.'1
Twombly's test, which was reaffirmed in Iqbal, requires courts
to (1) identify and separate pleadings of fact from legal conclusions and
(2) evaluate the pleadings of fact to determine whether "they plausibly
suggest an entitlement to relief."" 2 Direct infringement requires that
a defendant "makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention,
within the United States ... .""ts The Federal Circuit has held that a
plaintiffs showing of alleged infringement must reveal that "the
accused device contains each and every limitation of the asserted
claims," either literally or under the doctrine of equivalents, suggesting
that more detail may be required under Twombly and Iqbal than Form
18 provided.114
However, Adam Steinman has led the academic charge
concerning the overextension of Twombly and Iqbal-arguing that the
two cases have been misinterpreted and that the decisions clarify,
rather than significantly restrict, pleading standards."15 Steinman's
argument focuses on several Supreme Court pleading decisions postIqbal that return to the pre-Twombly notice-pleading regime that
dominated for almost seven decades.116
Finally, the Supreme Court has cited to policy that expresses the
importance of a self-policing patent system, noting the difficult task of
identifying and challenging "bad" patents.11 7 Rather than task this to

109.
Id. at 558-59.
110.
See AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW Ass'N, supra note 7.
111.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79, 687 (2009).
112.
Id. at 679-81.
35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2018).
113.
See Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., 773 F.3d 1201, 1215 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (citing
114.
Presidio Components, Inc. v. Am. Tech. Ceramics Corp., 702 F.3d 1351, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2012))
(emphasis omitted).
Adam N. Steinman, The Rise andFall of PlausibilityPleading?, 69 VAND. L. REV. 333,
115.
381 (2016).
116.
Id. at 367--80.
117.
See Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 670 (1969) ("[The equities of the licensor do
not weigh very heavily when they are balanced against the important public interest in
permitting full and free competition in the use of ideas which are in reality a part of the
public domain. Licensees may often be the only individuals with enough economic incentive
to challenge the patentability of an inventor's discovery. If they are muzzled, the public may
continually be required to pay tribute to would-be monopolists without need or
justification.").
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the US Patent and Trademark Office, the Court has noted a potential
infringer is among the most motivated to challenge patent validity
through an affirmative defense.11 8 A low pleading bar ensures that a
wider range of patents are challenged and promotes weeding out "bad"
patents. However, this interest must be balanced with the desire to
discourage frivolous lawsuits by patent trolls.119
A review of these sources of policy reveals several notable
observations. In the patent context, courts are left to balance FRCP 8's
notice function and concerns about costs and efficiency-which were
focused on and potentially heightened in Twombly and Iqbal-with
patent self-policing that the court has found necessary to maintain a
healthy patent system. However, this pleading standard must not be
so relaxed that patent trolls are permitted to bring frivolous suits to the
costly discovery phase.1 20
III. PLEADING TRENDS: A LOOK AT TWO YEARS OF PLEADING
STANDARDS
This Part analyzes opinions on motions to dismiss that were
collected in the two years immediately following the abrogation of FRCP
84. By analyzing these data, trends and factors that influence court
behavior when ruling on the sufficiency of pleadings are identified and
discussed. The dataset indicates a political divide in patent pleading
standards since 2015.
A. Methodology
This Note identifies 141 database-accessible 1 21 opinions1 22
rendered by federal district courts in 2016 and 2017 regarding motions
to dismiss direct patent infringement claims for insufficient pleading
pursuant to FRCP 12(b)(6). Motions to dismiss under FRCP 12(b)(6)
118.
Id. While potential infringers could pursue a declaratory judgement from a court or
an invalidity ruling from the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, a potential infringer's motivation is
arguably highest when facing an infringement suit. See id.
119.
James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Direct Costs from NPEDisputes,99 CORNELL
L. REV. 387, 397 (2014) (estimating approximately $29 billion in "socially wastefully ligationrelated expenditures" absorbed by law firms as a result of patent trolls-also known as nonpracticing entities-in 2011 alone).
120.
See Dan L. Burk, On the Sociology of Patenting, 101 MINN. L. REV. 421,446 (2016).
121.
The Author used both Thomson Reuters@ Westlaw and LexisNexis@ when compiling
the dataset. To identify cases, the Author ran the following search: "motion to dismiss" /p patent
AND "directinfringement."Theresults were then filtered to include district court opinions between
January 1, 2016 and December 31, 2017. When reading these opinions, the Author omitted
additional cases that did not meet the characteristics of the study, as described in this Section.
122.
The empirical dataset of opinions utilized in this study is on file with the Author and
is available upon request.
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not pertaining to direct infringement pled in the complaint were
removed.1 23 Finally, because case data were compared against Article
III judge characteristics,1 2 4 cases decided solely by magistrate judgesof which characteristics are not kept by the Federal Judicial Center
(FJC --or cases where an opinion by an Article III judge adopting the
magistrate's report could not be located were removed from the
dataset.1 25 This led to the removal of ten additional rulings. Opinions
issued by magistrate judges that were subsequently reviewed and
adopted in formal opinions by Article III judges, were included and the
pleading sufficiency standard applied was attributed to that Article III
judge, as appropriate.
Notably, the dataset included opinions that concerned the
sufficiency of a complaint filed prior to the abrogation of FRCP 84.126
While in some cases judges applied Form 18 based on interests of
"justice and practicability,"1 27 in other cases judges did not provide any
reasoning when deciding to retroactively apply Form 18.128 Because
this study does not analyze the underlying reasoning behind the
pleading standard applied, these cases were all included in the dataset.
Using these criteria, the Author filtered the identified cases,
resulting in the total number of opinions in the dataset being reduced
from over 300 to 141. From this dataset, several metrics were collected
to assess the state of direct infringement pleading since the abrogation

123.
For the purpose of this study, Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss for willful, contributory,
or induced patent infringement were removed because different standards cover them. See, e.g.,
Lyda v. CBS Corp., 838 F.3d 1331, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Additionally, Rule 12(b)(6) motions
decided on the basis of patent ineligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2018) (rather than
pleading sufficiency) were also omitted. See Genetic Techs. Ltd. v. Merial L.L.C., 818 F.3d 1369,
1373 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ("[I]t is possible and proper to determine patent eligibility under 35 U.S.C. §
101 on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion."). Further, in order to focus this study on infringement pleading,
motions to dismiss counterclaims of infringement were included, but counterclaims of
noninfringement were removed from the dataset. While subject to the same pleading standard,
the reasoning provided when ruling on these counterclaims was often sparse. See, e.g., PetEdge,
Inc. v. Marketfleet Sourcing, Inc., No. CV 16-12562-FDS, 2017 WL 2983086, at *3 (D. Mass. July
12, 2017) (using a mere sixty-two words to find a counterclaim insufficiently pled).
See Biographical Directory of Article 111 Federal Judges, 1789-Present, FED. JUD.
124.
CENTER, https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges [https://perma.ccl34KK-8SFL] (last visited Feb. 4,
2019).
See Magistrate Judgeships, FED. JUD. CTR., https-//www.fjc.gov/node/7501
125.
[https//perma.cclKQ84-AQYV] (last visited Feb. 4, 2019).
See, e.g., Prime Focus Creative Servs. Can. Inc. v. Legend3D, Inc., No.
126.
CV-15-2340-MWF (PLAx), 2016 WL 6678009, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2016).
See id. ("Because Rule 84 and Form 18 would have been in force at the time the Court
127.
considered Defendant's original motion to dismiss, it would not be just and practicable' to apply
the new Rules and any attendant heightened pleading standard ... ." (emphasis in original)
(citation omitted)).
See, e.g., John Keeler & Co. v. Heron Point Seafood, Inc., No. 1:14-CV-1652, 2016 WL
128.
6839615, at *4 (N.D. Ohio July 8, 2016) (applying Form 18 without discussion of whether Form 18
complies with Twombly or if it is merely being retroactively applied due to the filing date).
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of FRCP 84. These included the sufficiency of the complaint;1 2 9 which
pleading standard was applied; 3 0 and various judge characteristics
such as the judge's gender, 3 1 age, appointing party,1 32 American Bar
Association (ABA) qualification rating at the time of nomination,13 and
confirmation date,13 4 as well as whether the judge held a degree in the
sciences 3 5 and whether or not the judge received their law degree from
a top-fourteen (T14) law school.1 36
Finally, in response to the Federal Circuit's guidance regarding
patent complexity in Disc Disease' 37-where
the Federal Circuit

129.
For motions that were granted in part, the complaint was deemed insufficiently pled
because at least part of the pleading was dismissed. See, e.g., Novitaz, Inc. v. inMarket Media,
LLC, No. 16-CV-06795-EJD, 2017 WL 2311407 (N.D. Cal. May 26, 2017).
130.
For the five types of pleading standards utilized, see supra Section I.D. Oftentimes,
judges did not explicitly define a standard (even though they appeared to rely on one of the four
common standards) or relied on boilerplate language borrowed from Twombly and Iqbal. See, e.g.,
Howard v. Ford Motor Co., No. 1:16CV127-LG-RHW, 2016 WL 4077260, at *2 (S.D. Miss. July 29,
2016). In these instances where the judge was not explicit, a standard of "other" was recorded.
131.
Gender was included as a control variable.
132.
Judges' appointing party is often an effective and convenient metric to explain
behavior of the lower courts due to the difficulty in deviating from their political ideology. See
Daniel R. Pinello, Linking Party to Judicial Ideology in American Courts: A Meta-Analysis, 20
JUST. SYs. J. 219, 220 (1999). For an analysis noting the risks inherent in this approach, see
Michael A. Bailey, Measuring Ideology on the Courts, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF JUDICIAL
BEHAVIOR 65 (Robert M. Howard & Kirk A. Randazzo eds., 2017) ("Everyone recognizes the
dangers here; such an approach for Supreme Court justices, for example, would imply that Justices
Warren, Brennan, Stevens and Souter were to the right of Justice Frankfurter . . . ").
133.
See Ratings, AM. BAR ASS'N, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/committees/
federal-judiciary/ratings.html [https://perma.cclMS2W-RMVE] (last visited Feb. 4, 2019). Judicial
nominees are either rated "Well Qualified," "Qualified," or "Not Qualified" by the Standing
Committee. Id.
134.
This was used to calculate the judge's experience on the bench at the time of the
opinion by subtracting the judge's confirmation date from the date of the opinion.
135.
For purposes of this study, a degree in the sciences is considered to be a Bachelor of
Science (B.S.) or Master of Science (M.S.). The Author acknowledges that this is an imperfect
metric, as not all B.S. and M.S. degrees pertain to disciplines that are traditionally related to
patents or technology. See, e.g., College of Arts and Sciences Bulletin 2016-2017: List of Bachelor
of Science Degrees, IND. UNIV., http*/Ibulletins.iu.eduliub/college/2016-2017/admission/majorsminors/bachelor-science.shtml [https/perma.cc/26UJ-FJ7V] (last visited Feb. 4, 2019) (offering,
for example, B.S. degrees in Interior Design and International Studies).
136.
See KivvlT, HIDDEN IN PLAIN SIGHT: LESSONS FROM THE 2018 U.S. NEWS LAW SCHOOL
RANKINGS 6 (2018) https://www.kivvit.com/KivvitUSNReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/
CY7X-L5GJ]. While the list is updated annually, the T14 law schools remain relatively constant.
Id. The 2018 list was utilized for purposes of this analysis, and consists of Yale University,
Stanford University, Harvard University, University of Chicago, Columbia University, New York
University, University of Pennsylvania, University of Michigan-Ann Arbor, University of Virginia,
Duke University, Northwestern University (Pritzker), University of California-Berkeley, Cornell
University, and the University of Texas-Austin. Id.
137.
See Disc Disease Sols. Inc. v. VGH Sols., Inc., 888 F.3d 1256, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2018)
("[The] allegations are sufficient under the IqballTwombly plausibility standard. This case
involves a simple technology. The asserted patents, which were attached to the complaint, consist
of only four independent claims."). The reasoning in this case arguably shifts the focus of the
inquiry towards the complexity of the technology when resolving a motion to dismiss. Id.
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directed the focus of the inquiry towards the complexity of the
technology-the number of independent claims, total claims, drawing
sheets, and total number of pages was collected for each patent at issue.
For cases with multiple patents-in-suit, these numbers were averaged
for each patent. While there are many ways to analyze complexity, the
Federal Circuit specifically noted the number of independent claims
when discussing the complexity of the patents at issue in Disc Disease
Solutions.'"
B. Overall Results
For the two-year period analyzed, the overall pleading
sufficiency rate was 62 percent, slightly higher than the 56 percent
sufficiency rate found by Christian E. Mammen and other scholars
during roughly the same period. 3 9 When analyzing the pleading
standards applied nationwide, Table 1 demonstrates that a majority of
judges did not apply a rigid pleading standard, but rather applied
Twombly/Iqbal principles on a case-by-case basis. Many of these cases
illuminate a common thread: that Form 18 pleading may remain
sufficient for simple technologies, whereas additional pleading may be
required for complex inventions.1 40 While still claiming to satisfy
Twombly and Iqbal, this other pleading standard appeared to be just as
rigid as each claim pleading in some instances and as simplistic as Form
18 pleading in others.

While there are many studies assessing patent complexity, see, for example, infra note
138.
192, the Federal Circuit specifically noted the number of independent claims in the patents-in-suit
when discussing the complexity of the patents at issue in Disc Disease. See 888 F.3d at 1260. For
cases with multiple patents, these numbers were summed, as the court did in Disc Disease. Id.
See Mammen, supra note 6, at 2.
139.
140.
See, e.g., Niazi v. Pressure Prods. Med. Supplies, Inc., No. 16-CV-670-jdp, 2017 WL
108114, at *1 (W.D. Wis. 2017) ("First, the old Form 18 approach is still generally sufficient to
articulate a plausible claim for direct infringement. . . .In most patent cases, iderifying the claims
asserted and the devices accused will be enough to do the job. . . .").
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Table 1. Number of Motions and Pleading Sufficiency Rate by
Pleading Standard
Number of
Motions

Sufficiency Rate

Each Claim

20

30%

At Least One Claim

30

50%

Unique Feature

12

100%

Form 18

15

100%

Other

64

63%

Nationwide

141

62%

Unsurprisingly, the pleading sufficiency rate was lowest for the
most rigid and demanding standards, and grew as the pleading
standard became less strict.
C. Results by District
During the period analyzed, thirty-six of ninety-four federal
districts decided a motion to dismiss on the pleadings for a claim of
direct infringement, with ten districts handling five or more motions.
The pleading sufficiency rates of these districts are summarized in
Table 2. There are few surprises on the list-the US District Courts for
the District of Delaware, the Southern District of California, and the
Eastern District of Texas lead the group for most motions resolved.141
The Eastern District of Texas, a traditionally pro-patentee district,1 42
had the highest pleading sufficiency rate, followed closely by the
District of Delaware. This may come as a relief to plaintiffs, as
Delaware is widely seen as replacing the Eastern District of Texas as
the go-to patent venue in light of the Supreme Court's recent decision
in TC Heartland,LLC v. Kraft Foods Brand Group, LLC.14a

141.
Jacqueline Bell, PatentLitigation in US District Courts:A2016 Review, LAW360 (Mar.
1, 2017, 12:13 PM), https*//www.law360.com/articles/895435/patent-litigation-in-us-districtcourts-a-2016-review [https://perma.ccl3X6P-6UXM].
142.
Jeff Bounds, Meet the New IGng ofPatent Litigation(Sorry East Texas), TEX. LAWBOOK
(Sep. 22, 2017, 6:14 PM), https://www.bizjournals.com/dallas/news/2017/09/22/meet-the-new-kingof-patent-litigation-sorry-east.html [https/perma.cc/TZ9Y-V6SH].
143.
Id. In TC Heartland, the Supreme Court reigned in patent venue by holding that a
domestic corporation resides only in its state of incorporation under the patent venue statute 28
U.S.C. § 1400(b) (2018). See TC Heartland, LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands, LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514,
1521 (2017).
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Table 2. Pleading Sufficiency Rates Among District Courts
That Handled at Least Five Motions to Dismiss from

2016-2017144
Total

Sufficiency

Motions
11

Rate
45%

Northern District of California

7

43%

Southern District of California

14

District of Delaware
Southern District of Florida

2016

2017

44%

50%

50%

33%

36%

11%

80%"

15

87%

80%

900/

7

00/0

0%

0/0

Northern District of Illinois

7

43%

0%

75%"

District of Massachusetts

5

60%

50%

67%

District of Nevada

8

75%

50%

100%

District of New Jersey

6

83%

80%

100%

Eastern District of Texas

17

82%

71%

90%%

Nationwide

141

62%

48%

77%

Central District of California

The district data become interesting when the dataset is broken
down by year, which suggests a shift in behavior in the patent litigation
community to adjust to the abrogation of FRCP 84. Despite seeing a
similar quantity of motions between the two years, pleading sufficiency
rebounded to 77 percent in 2017 after falling to 48 percent in 2016. This
suggests the low pleading sufficiency rates discovered by scholars in
2016 may not be as alarming as they initially appear.1 45 Whether courts
have applied a more lenient pleading standard (despite claiming to
apply the same standard), or whether plaintiffs have adapted to the
change is beyond the scope of this study; however, the data suggest the
patent community is rebounding to the national average.146
D. FactorsInfluencing Judge Behavior
For the purpose of this analysis, pleading sufficiency rates and
pleading standards applied by each judge are broken down and
analyzed by the judge characteristics collected and discussed in Section
IV.A. Although most judge characteristics had an insignificant effect
Asterisks indicate a difference between 2016 and 2017 in that district. Differences are
144.
calculated using a z-test analysis. ** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5
percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level.
See Mammen, supra note 6, at 2.
145.
See Patricia W. Hatamyar Moore, An Updated Quantitative Study of Iqbal's Impact
146.
on 12(bX6) Motions, 46 U. RICH. L. REv. 603, 613-14 (2011).
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on pleading sufficiency rate and pleading standards, political affiliation
was found to be significant.
1. Gender
Gender was not a significant factor in pleading sufficiency rate.
The pleading standard utilized was also mostly insignificant. This was
unsurprising, and this data were collected as a form of control statistic
against the other metrics collected.
2. Age
Age did not have a significant impact on pleading sufficiency.
Although substantial research exists that suggests that technology
usage decreases significantly with age, senior judges' potential lack of
experience with technology did not appear to impact their ability to rule
on the sufficiency of the direct infringement complaint. 4 7 Rather, the
data demonstrate there is no significant trend for either metric.
Notably, the pleading standards breakdown is nearly identical for the
three age groups (ages 50-59, 60-69, and 70-79) that resolved at least
twenty motions during the sample period.
3. Science Degree
The possession of a science degree also did not significantly
impact the results. If anything, the presence of a science degree slightly
increased the pleading sufficiency rate, although this trend was not
statistically significant.
However, as Table 3 demonstrates, a
significant difference was observed in the frequency of judges without
science degrees utilizing "other" as a pleading standard. As previously
discussed, other pleading was designated to any opinions where judges
chose not to define a pleading standard, instead giving themselves
flexibility (and litigants uncertainty) by relying on the generic language
of Twombly.148 Whether this is because scientists traditionally favor
rigid tests with clear rules or for some other reason is beyond the scope
of this study. 4 9

147.
See Aaron Smith, Older Adults and Technology Use, PEW RES. CTR. (Apr. 3, 2014),
http://www.pewinternet.org/2014/04/03/older-adults-and-technology-use/ [https://perma.cc/9S46XXVD].

148.

See supra Section I.D.5.

See Anne Roe, A PsychologistExamines 64 Eminent Scientists, 187 Sci. AM. 21, 23
(1952) (examining background, personality, and skills characteristics of scientists).
149.
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Table 3. Pleading Sufficiency Standard by Science Degree

50

Number
of
Motions

Each
Claim

At Least
One
Claim

Unique
Feature

Form 18

Other

Science Degree

19

21%

32%

11%

16%

21%

Nonscience Degree

122

13%

20%

8%

10%

49%**

4. Law School
Holding a law degree from a T14 law school was also not a
significant factor in pleading sufficiency rate or pleading standard
selection, with the exception of a T14 law school preference for the
unique feature pleading standard.11 In fact, percentages were nearly
identical in almost all categories between judges holding degrees from
T14 law schools and their colleagues.
5. ABA Qualification
ABA qualification at the time of confirmation also made little
difference in either pleading sufficiency rate or pleading standard
applied.15 2 The data show little difference between 'Well Qualified" and
"Qualified" judges in both pleading sufficiency rate and the pleading
standard applied. There is a difference between these categories and
"Not Qualified" judges, but this difference is not significant as there
were only eight "Not Qualified" cases, all of which were handled by the
same judge and featured the same plaintiff. 5 3
6. Judicial Experience
Judicial experience was measured as the number of years on the
bench when the decision on pleading sufficiency was made. Like the
other factors analyzed thus far, judicial experience was also not a
significant indicator of pleading sufficiency rate or which pleading

Asterisks indicate a difference between judges with science degrees and nonscience
150.
degrees within each pleading standard. Differences are calculated using a z-test analysis. ***
Significant at the 1 percent leveL ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10
percent leveL
Judges from T14 law schools utilized the "unique feature" standard in 15 percent of
151.
cases analyzed; non-T14 law school judges only utilized the standard in 5 percent of cases. This
variation was significant at the 5 percent leveL
One judge did not have a qualification on the FJC database, and thus the total dataset
152.
for ABA qualification is only 140 motions.
See, e.g., Anza Tech., Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., No. 3:16-CV-01263-BEN-AGS, 2016 WL
153.
8732647, at *1 n.1 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2016).
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standard was applied, as there is no significant trend for either pleading
sufficiency rate or pleading standard with respect to this variable.
7. Appointing Political Party
Tables 4 and 5 demonstrate a significant variation in both
pleading sufficiency rates and pleading standards applied between
judges appointed by Democratic versus Republican presidents. In
general, judges appointed by Democratic presidents appear more likely
to deny a motion to dismiss under FRCP 12(b)(6) by using the flexible
other pleading standard. In contrast, judges appointed by Republican
presidents have a noticeably lower pleading sufficiency rate and are
more likely to use rigid pleading standards when ruling on motions to
dismiss.
Table 4. Pleading Sufficiency Rate by Appointing Political
Party 54
Number of
Motions

Pleading
Suficiency

Sufficiently
Pled

Republican President Appointee

61

33

54%*

Democratic President Appointee

80

55

69%

Totals

141

88

62%

Table 5. Pleading Sufficiency Standard by Appointing Political
Party 5 s
Number

Democratic
President
Appointee

At Least
One

Unique
Uniqu
Feature

Form 18

28%*

30%*

8%

8%

4%

15%

90

13%

Each

Claim

61

Motions

Republican
President
Appointee

of

of

Other

Claim

26%*

*

154.
Asterisks indicate a difference between judges with different political affiliations.
Differences are calculated using a z-test analysis. ** Significant at the 1 percent level.
Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level.
155.
Asterisks indicate a difference between judges with different political affiliations
within each pleading standard. Differences are calculated using a z-test analysis. *** Significant
at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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First, it is important to reaffirm that age and experience are not
factors in this result. Due to President Obama's two terms, the most
recently a Republican president could have appointed a judge for
purposes of this study was 2008, as President Trump did not appoint
any judges studied in this dataset. As a result, one could argue that the
greater age'56 and experience 5 7 of judges appointed by a Republican
president may factor into this result. Yet, as previously discussed, age
and experience were not significant in predicting either pleading
sufficiency rate or pleading standard.
Rather, these results support the conclusion that patent policy
is correlated with political ideology. This result is surprising, both
because sufficiency of pleadings are often viewed as a procedural issue
and because scholars have often argued that intellectual property is
immune from political polarization.168 However, scholars have argued
that since Twombly and Iqbal, a decision on pleading sufficiency
requires courts to substantively rule on what is "plausible" given the
facts plead. 59 And others have argued that this position may be
incorrect,160 noting that patents have become more political in the last
decade as both the Supreme Court and Congress have taken a more
active role in policymaking.161 Notably, a groundbreaking empirical
study by Matthew Sag, Tonja Jacobi, and Maxim Sytch convincingly
argued that conservative judges more often rule in favor of enforcing

156.
The average age of judges appointed by Republican presidents who resolved at least
one motion to dismiss in this dataset was 67.1 years, compared to 61.3 years for judges appointed
by Democratic presidents.
The average experience of judges appointed by Republican presidents who resolved at
157.
least one motion to dismiss in this dataset was 17.9 years, compared to 11.2 years for judges
appointed by Democratic presidents.
See Gregory N. Mandel, Institutional Fracture in Intellectual Property Law: The
158.
Supreme Court Versus Congress, 102 MINN. L. REV. 803, 838-39 (2017) (observing that Congress
has enacted patent-strengthening laws at times when both Democrats and Republicans have held
control of both houses of Congress); Kimberly A. Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped To
Resolve Patent Cases?, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 27 (2001) (concluding no difference in how
Republican and Democratic judges construed patent claims).
159.
See Edward Brunet, The Substantive Originsof 'PlausiblePleadings"-AnIntroduction
to the Symposium on Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1, 10 (2010); Elizabeth M.
Schneider & Nancy Gertner, "Only Procedural": Thoughts on Substantive Law Dimensions of
PreliminaryProceduralDecisions in Employment Discrimination Cases, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV.
767, 768 (2013).
160.
See Matthew Sag, Tonja Jacobi & Maxim Sytch, Ideology and Exceptionalism in
IntellectualProperty:An Empirical Study, 97 CAL. L. REV. 801, 849 (2009).
Hayden W. Gregory, LP and the Romance with Its Policy Makers: Can This Marriage
161.
Be Saved?, 8 LANDSLIDE 16, 19-20 (2016) (arguing the Supreme Court has abandoned its laissez
faire approach to patent law in recent cases such as Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010) and Alice
Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Intl, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014), and that policymakers and public interest
groups have responded in turn).
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strong intellectual property rights, but that this ideological effect is less
pronounced than in non-IP cases.1 62
Under this political lens, there are two potential ways to
approach this result. The first, from the Democratic point of view, is
that judges appointed by Democratic presidents are properly applying
the Twomblyllqbal pleading standard, which was never designed to be
a rigid pleading standard but rather a fact-specific inquiry that must
vary case-to-case.1 63 Further, by requiring a less rigid pleading
standard, cases are more likely to be resolved on the merits than at the
pleading stage, as Twombly and Iqbal intended.'" Judges appointed
by Democratic presidents can point to the fact that the Federal Circuit
has refused to state whether Form 18 was inconsistent with Twombly
and Iqbal as a way to argue the abrogation of FRCP 84 did little to
change pleading requirements.1 6 5 Judges appointed by Republican
presidents would argue stricter pleading standards are needed and that
the contrary position permits frivolous suits by patent trolls and other
NPE's to enter the costly discovery phase.166
The second approach-which provides a counterargument to the
Democratic position-argues that the position of judges appointed by
Republican presidents creates clear rules to expedite the pleading stage
and aligns with the national averages for FRCP 12(b)(6) motions to
dismiss.1 67 In 2011, Patricia Hatamyar Moore found a nationwide
pleading sufficiency rate of 40 percent post-Iqbal.168 Both the instant
study and Hatamyar Moore's study analyzed data two years
immediately following a "seismic" event in motions to dismiss-namely,
the abrogation of FRCP 84, and the Iqbal decision, respectively. The 49
percent pleading sufficiency rate among judges appointed by

162.
See Sag, Jacobi & Sytch, supra note 160, at 847-49.
163.
See, e.g., Evergreen Partnering Grp., Inc. v. Pactiv Corp., 720 F.3d 33, 43-44 (1st Cir.
2013) ("Courts have evaluated the line between 'merely' alleging parallel conduct and alleging
plausible agreement on a case-by-case basis after Twombly . .. ."); In re Medtronic, Inc., Sprint
Fidelis Leads Prod. Liab. Litig., 623 F.3d 1200, 1209 (8th Cir. 2010) ("To apply Twombly rigidly
without permitting discovery as to these documents effectively creates an impossible-to-achieve
specificity requirement. I do not believe the Court intended Twombly to create this type of
insurmountable hurdle. Rather, I believe the application of Twombly must be pragmatic.").
164.
See, e.g., Sepulveda-Villarini v. Dep't of Educ., 628 F.3d 25, 30 (1st Cir. 2010) ("But
Twombly cautioned against thinking of plausibility as a standard of likely success on the merits;
the standard is plausibility assuming the pleaded facts to be true and read in a plaintiffs favor.").
165.
Lifetime Indus., Inc., v. Trim-Lok, Inc. 869 F.3d 1372, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
See Burk, supranote 120, at 446.
166.
167.
See, e.g., Rampage, LLC v. Glob. Graphics SE, No. 16-CV-10691-ADB, 2017 WL
239328, at *2 (D. Mass. Jan. 19, 2017) ("Use of the Twomblyllqbal standard also promotes
uniformity across the judicial system, whereas reliance on a now-abrogated form would only cause
confusion and inconsistency." (citation omitted)).
168.
See Hatamyar Moore, supra note 146, at 613--14.
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Republican presidents in this study fits within the range of Hatamyar
Moore's results.
However, this finding that judges appointed by Republican
presidents are dismissing more infringement complaints-and making
it more difficult to enforce patent property rights as a result-is
surprising given prior studies of IP polarization, which argue
Republicans favor strong patent protection.1 69 In contrast, Mark
Lemley reasons that the patent system is a restriction on property
rights and free markets,1 70 which most conservatives are likely to
disfavor. As a result, conservatives must balance protection of private
property with free market restrictions when analyzing the patent
system. 171 These conflicting positions may help explain this trend.
Additionally, there has been evidence of growing disfavor of the patent
system among Republicans during the Trump presidency, which could
influence this result.1 72
8. Patent Complexity
The complexity of the patents-in-suit had no influence on the
pleading sufficiency rate or the pleading standard applied. Contrary to
the teachings of Disc Disease Solutions, cases with only one
independent claim had the lowest pleading sufficiency rate (44 percent),
but this rate was not statistically significant. The only indicator that
patent complexity impacted pleading sufficiency was in drawing sheets,
where cases involving patents with less than five drawing sheets were
15 percent more likely to survive a motion to dismiss than cases with
patents involving more than ten drawing sheets. Again, this difference
was not statistically significant.
The number of total claims and independent claims did not
impact the pleading standard utilized, although there was a slight
trend towards using the stricter each claim and at least one claim
standards in cases with fewer drawing sheets and fewer total pages.
This may indicate judges' wishes to see a greater level of detail when
the patent can be easily reviewed. However, it is surprising that the

See Sag, Jacobi & Sytch, supra note 160, at 849.
169.
170.
See Mark A. Lemley, The Regulatory Turn in IP, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 109, 110
(2013).
171.
Id.
172.
See Steve Brachmann, Former Trump Campaign Advisor: 'Today, Patents Are
Worthless," IP WATCHDOG (Aug. 24, 2017), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/08/24/former-trumpadvisor-patents-worthless/id=87207/ [https://perma.cc/W2VP-H4VS]; Jan Wolfe, U.S. Patent
Review Board Becomes Conservative Target, REUTERS (Nov. 20, 2017, 12:05 AM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-patent-ptabu-s-patent-review-board-becomesconservative-target-idUSKIBN1DKOEB [https://perma.ccl4KA2-C5YJ].
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pleading sufficiency rate is relatively constant regardless of patent
complexity, as more complexity would require judges (under several of
the analyzed pleading standards) to sufficiently understand the
technology at the motion to dismiss stage to determine whether
infringement allegations are plausible.
A future review of these same metrics using post-Disc Disease
cases will shed light on what metrics, if any, judges use when
determining the complexity of the technology.
9. Reviewing Judge Gilstrap and Judge Andrews
Finally, it is worthwhile to briefly discuss the jurisprudence of
Judge Gilstrap of the Eastern District of Texas and Judge Andrews of
the District of Delaware. These judges resolved the most motions to
dismiss during the analyzed period and are likely to continue to see a
high volume of motions due to their patent-heavy districts. 7 3
Judge Gilstrap resolved thirteen motions during the studied
period, often with the assistance of a magistrate judge.174 Of these
motions, Judge Gilstrap ruled that 85 percent of complaints were
sufficiently pled overall, rising from 50 percent in 2016 to 100 percent
in 2017, although Judge Gilstrap only handled four motions in 2016.
Judge Gilstrap has been steadfast in not declaring a specific pleading
standard, appearing to opt for the generic language of Twombly in all
of his opinions. 76 While this provides flexibility and allows the Eastern
District of Texas to continue its pro-plaintiff reputation,1 76 it can create
uncertainty not seen under the Form 18 pleading standard.
Judge Andrews is likely to experience the largest patent docket
in the country for the foreseeable future in the aftermath of TC
Heartland.'7 7 During the period analyzed, Judge Andrews resolved
nine motions, ruling that 78 percent of complaints were sufficiently pled
173.
See Bounds, supranote 142.
174.
See, e.g., Semcon IP, Inc. v. Huawei Device USA, Inc., No. 2:16-cv-437-JRG-RSP, 2017
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36606, at *5 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 14, 2017) (adopting the report and recommendation
of the magistrate judge in full by Judge Gilstrap). Judge Gilstrap utilized a magistrate judge in
seven of his thirteen opinions in the dataset.
175.
See, e.g., Solocron Educ., LLC v. Healthstream, Inc., No. 2:16-CV-16-JRG, 2016 WL
9137458, at *3 (E.D. Tex. June 7, 2016) ("[C]laims for direct infringement must nevertheless
satisfy the pleadings standards set forth by the Supreme Court in Twombly and Iqbal.
Determining whether a complaint states a claim for infringement is a very 'context specific task.'").
176.
See Bounds, supra note 142.
177.
See TC Heartland, LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands, LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514, 1520 (2017);
Bounds, supra note 142. As a result, plaintiff-friendly districts, such as the Eastern District of
Texas, may no longer be a possible venue if the defendant is not (1) incorporated within the state
or (2) committing acts of infringement and has a regular and established place of business within
the district. Bounds, supra note 142. In contrast, the District of Delaware, where most businesses
are incorporated, is expected to see an increase in patent litigation. See id.
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(67 percent in 2016, and 83 percent in 2017). Judge Andrews also
utilized a magistrate judge in many opinions.1 78 Like Judge Gilstrap,
Judge Andrews appears hesitant to define a specific pleading standard;
however, he has frequently continued to apply Form 18 pleading
standards when the complaint was filed prior to the abrogation of FRCP
84.179
IV. PLEADING FOR A RESOLUTION

After reviewing the decisions of the Federal Circuit, along with
data collected from district courts since the abrogation of FRCP 84, it is
clear that a uniform pleading standard is necessary to avoid confusion,
inefficiency, and potential politicization of patent pleading. However,
this pleading standard must survive an analysis under Twombly and
Iqbal. It is significant to note that since Twombly's inception, scholars
have criticized the heightened scrutiny of defendant's answers in direct
infringement lawsuits while courts continue to permit the bare-bones
pleading standard in complaints. 8 0 It is likely courts have overlooked
this analysis of pleadings due to the long tradition of Form 18.
On a broader level, Twombly's overarching policy goalsnamely, reducing costs and time of litigation-apply to all areas of law
and are especially relevant in the expensive patent litigation realm.181
Given these concerns, it is unthinkable that the Supreme Court would
approve of a system that creates extensive delays and undue costs
during prelitigation,1 82 while simultaneously serving as a potential bar
to the courtroom by requiring extensive research to satisfy heightened
pleading standards. 88
Worse yet, the Federal Circuit has further muddied the situation
with its opinion in Disc Disease Solutions, which provided little
reasoning beyond its assertion that at least one claim pleading was
See, e.g., Zimmer Surgical, Inc. v. Stryker Corp., No. CV 16-679-RGA-MPT, 2017 WL
178.
3736750, at *2 (D. Del. Aug. 30, 2017) (adopting the report and recommendation of the magistrate
judge with regard to direct infringement by Judge Andrews). Judge Andrews utilized a magistrate
judge in three of his nine opinions in the dataset.
See, e.g., Waters Techs. Corp. v. Aurora SFC Sys., No. 11-708-RGA, 2017 U.S. Dist.
179.
LEXIS 132901, at *11 (D. Del. Aug. 21, 2017) ("Given that the amended complaint was filed more
than four years ago, I do not think it is proper to evaluate it under the December 1, 2015
amendments abrogating Form 18.").
See R. David Donoghue, The Uneven Application of Twombly in Patent Cases: An
180.
Argument for Leveling the Playing Field, 8 J. MARSHALL REV. INTEIL. PROP. L. 1, 3 (2008);
Yekaterina Korostash, Pleading Standards in Patent Litigation After Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 14 INTELL. PROP. STRATEGIST 1, 8 (2008).
See Bell AtL Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558-59 (2007).
181.
See, e.g., Artrip v. Ball Corp., No. 1:14CV00014, 2017 WL 3669518, at *5 (W.D. Va.
182.
Aug. 24, 2017) (permitting plaintiff to file a third amended complaint).
Id.
183.
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appropriate for simple technologies. In a pre-Disc Disease world, the
judge merely had to determine which pleading standard applied and
whether the complaint satisfied it. Post-Disc Disease, a judge must now
determine a number of factors: (1) how complex the technology is, (2)
which pleading standard applies to this level of complexity to satisfy
the Twombly/Iqbal pleading standard, and (3) whether the complaint
meets that pleading standard.1 84 The Federal Circuit provided little
guidance for answering these and other relevant questions. 8 5
This creates at least two problems for practitioners moving
forward. First, each inquiry is now subject to the political bias and
subjectivity this study has identified.186 Second, for all the flaws of the
post-Form 18 world, many of the judges analyzed in this study
uniformly applied a single pleading standard across their entire patent
docket.1 87 Post-DiscDisease, a single judge could potentially apply five
(or more!) different pleading standards based on the complexity of the
technology at issue. 8 8 Both problems reduce the level of predictability
and efficiency in the system.
With this framework in mind, the following is a brief assessment
of how each pleading standard discussed in Section I.D may withstand
scrutiny under the Twombly/Iqbal pleading standard, stated patent
policy goals, and empirical data analysis. Because pleadings are
extremely fact specific, it is impossible to make blanket statements
about whether certain pleading standards will always survive a failure
to state a claim challenge.
A Each Claim Pleading
As discussed in Part III, the demanding each claim pleading
standard has been frequently used by judges appointed by Republican
presidents and has resulted in the highest dismissal rate among

184.
Cf. Disc Disease Sols., Inc. v. VGH Sols., Inc., 888 F.3d 1256, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2018)
(deciding pleading sufficiency based on the complexity of the patented technology, but failing to
discuss what metric, if any, should be used to define complexity).
185.
See Stephanie Scruggs & Jessica Zurlo, Some Fed. Circ. Guidance on Patent Pleading
Standard,IAW360 (May 4, 2018, 5:49 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1040535/
some-fed-circ-guidance-on-patent-pleading-standard
[https://perma.ccFT82-6VL3] (discussing
other unanswered questions in the wake of Disc Disease, including the relationship between the
number of independent claims and patent complexity).
186.
See supra Section III.D.
187.
See supra Section III.D.
188.
While Judge Reyna declared that "at least one claim" pleading was appropriate in
cases involving "simple technology," Disc Disease does not answer whether "at least one claim" is
a minimum pleading standard or if an even more relaxed standard may be appropriate for simpler
technology than the spinal brace at issue in Disc Disease. See 888 F.3d at 1260.
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standards.189 Complaints satisfying the each claim pleading standard
are more likely to be found sufficient under Twombly and Iqbal, as they
individually spell out and identify each claim and how the defendant
infringed. 90 However, the data suggest the pleading standard may be
too demanding, with only 30 percent of claims sufficiently pled under
this standard.191 In an era where patents have never been longer,
requiring such detail may place too high of a burden on plaintiffs at the
pleading stage, which may be unavailable without additional
information.1 92 This barrier to entry runs afoul of the established policy
in Twombly by requiring a plaintiff to do extensive research about the
relationship between a patent and an infringing product (almost akin
to claim construction, where terms in a patent are construed) without
the benefit of discovery.193 This is overly burdensome, given the
procedural safeguard permitting amended complaints during discovery
if new information is found.1 94 Collectively, the policy considerations
and low sufficiency rate discourage continued use of the each claim
pleading standard.
B. At Least One Claim Pleading
Plaintiffs have found more success with the at least one claim
pleading standard, with roughly 50 percent of pleadings in the dataset
ruled sufficient.195 This percentage is more favorable to plaintiffs and
closer to similar studies on overall pleading sufficiency rate.1 96 While
the Federal Circuit has verified this standard complies with Twombly
and Iqbal in cases involving simple technologies, a defendant may lack
requisite notice of any additional claims, running the risk that issues
See supra Section III.D.
189.
The Federal Circuit's approval of "at least one claim" pleading lends strong support
190.
that "each claim" pleading is sufficient under Twombly. See Disc Disease, 888 F.3d at 1260.
191.
See supra Section III.B.
192.
John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, The Growing Complexity of the United States
Patent System, 82 B.U. L. REV. 77, 79 (2002) (finding that the average number of claims per patent
has risen from 9.94 in the 1970s to 14.87 in the 1990s); Kristen Osenga, The Shape of Things to
Come: What We Can Learn from Patent Claim Length, 28 SANTA CLARA COMPUT. & HIGH TECH.
L.J. 617, 629-30, 632 n.53, 633 n.54 (2012) (studying over 4,500 patents from 1958 to 2008, and
finding that average words per claim has remained relatively steady at 175.1 words per
independent claim and 41.2 words per dependent claim).
193.
See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007) ("Asking for plausible grounds
to infer an agreement does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage; it simply
calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of illegal
agreement.").
The Federal Rules permit plaintiffs to amend their complaints during discovery if
194.
additional claims for relief arise. See FED. R. CIV. P. 15 (mandating that a court freely give a party
leave to amend its complaint at any time "when justice so requires").
195.
See supra Secticn M.B.
See Hatamyar Moore, supra note 146, at 613-14.
196.
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are not narrowed prior to discovery.197 To alleviate these concerns, the
Federal Circuit should add a limitation to the at least one claim
pleading standard to allow plaintiffs to merely mention-and not plead
each element of-additional claims encompassed within the same
patent once they have pled sufficient facts to allege at least one claim,

regardless of the technology at issue.

This would provide notice to

defendants that any named claim within a given patent is subject to

litigation,

without permitting

plaintiffs

to piggyback additional

patents-even within the same patent family-without sufficient facts.

Under Twombly's policy aims, this modification to the at least one claim
pleading standard puts the defendant on notice of the causes of action,
while maintaining FRCP 8's efficiency goals by preventing overly
demanding and costly work by the plaintiff and court during the
pleading process. 9 8 This modified pleading standard also encourages
filtration of frivolous suits by patent trolls by requiring a minimum
level of facts to support infringement without closing the door to cases

that may legitimately challenge "bad" patents but which require
discovery.199

C. Unique FeaturePleading
Unique feature pleading lowers the burden on the plaintiff even
further, but a look at the data shows inherent problems with the
pleading standard. In the period analyzed, every single complaint
analyzed under the unique feature pleading standard was deemed

sufficiently pled. This leads to issues with subjectivity and bias, which
can be particularly trying to litigants that are not on notice of the
requirements. Under this pleading standard, courts are tasked with
deciding if the patented product even has a unique feature, and if so,

whether it is embodied in the infringing product.

Such a subjective

inquiry runs the risk of judges incorporating an "I know it when I see

it" approach, 200 a test which is often criticized as being based on a

197.
Disc Disease Sols., Inc. v. VGH Sols., Inc., 888 F.3d 1256, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2018); see
AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW As8'N, supra note 7 (summarizing the costs of discovery in patent
litigation).
198.
While rare, courts have been known to dismiss complaints for being too long or
rambling, citing the creation of undue work on the court and defendant in analyzing and answering
the complaint. See, e.g., Koplow v. Watson, 751 F. Supp. 2d 317, 321 (D. Mass. 2010) (dismissing
500-page complaint for failure to satisfy FRCP 8).
199.
See Burk, supra note 120, at 446 ("Patent trolling appears to be directly responsible
for a number of judicial changes in patent doctrine and procedure .").
200.
See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice
Stewart famously established this "test" when determining whether a motion picture qualified as
pornographic material, and it has been repeated in courts ever since. See, e.g., Stanojkova v.
Holder, 645 F.3d 943, 949 (7th Cir. 2011).
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"nonrational, intuitive gut reaction, instead of reasoned analysis." 2 01
Such a pleading standard creates the potential for subjectivity and
unwelcome confusion for plaintiffs. As the subjectivity of the pleading
standards creates the ability to impact pleading sufficiency-a trend
noted with respect to political affiliation-such a subjective pleading
standard is not recommended if uniformity is sought.
Further, FRCP 8's notice requirement may be scrutinized here,
as reasonable minds could disagree whether pleading a unique feature,
which is often only one limitation of a claim, is sufficient to provide a
defendant the requisite notice that the Federal Rules and Twombly
require. These lingering doubts further teach away from the unique
pleading standard.
D. Form 18 Pleading
Some courts have permitted plaintiffs to adequately plead direct
infringement using the now-abrogated Form 18.202 A review of the form
clearly puts such a pleading in the crosshairs of Twombly, as it does
little to establish a claim to relief besides provide a blanket statement
of infringement borrowed heavily from 35 U.S.C. § 271.203 Courts are
likely to find many of the statements in Form 18 to be legal conclusions
which must be struck from the pleadings under Twombly and Iqbal.
However, under existing Federal Circuit precedent, Twombly's
pleading standard has not killed Form 18, despite the apparent conflict
between the two and the abrogation of the Form.20 4 Indeed, courts
utilizing and defending this pleading standard have pointed to this
precedent when denying motions to dismiss. 205 Form 18 pleading also
opens the door for patent trolls, risks costly and unnecessary discovery
for claims lacking merit, and provides questionable notice to defendants
of the issues being litigated. 206 For these reasons alone, courts should
continue to apply Form 18 pleading only to complaints filed prior to

201.
See Paul Gewirtz, On "I Know It When I See It," 105 YALE L.J. 1023, 1025 (1996).
202.
See Hologram USA, Inc. v. Pulse Evolution Corp., No. 2:14-CV-0772-GMN-NJK, 2016
WL 199417, at *2 n.1 (D. Nev. Jan. 15, 2016); supra Section I.D.
Compare FED. R. CIV. P. Form 18 (2014) (abrogated 2015) ("The defendant has
203.
infringed and is still infringing the letters patent by making, selling, and using [electric motors]
that embody the patented invention.. . ."), with 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2018) ("[W]hoever without
authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention.. . infringes the patent.").
See Lifetime Indus., Inc. v. Trim-Lok, Inc., 869 F.3d 1372, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Lyda
204.
v. CBS Corp., 838 F.3d 1331, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ("For claims of direct patent infringement, this
court has determined that the pleading requirements of Form 18 suffice to survive a motion to

dismiss.").
205.
206.

Hologram USA, 2016 WL 199417, at *2.
See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1957); Harmon, supranote 20.
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abrogation when justice and practicability require, regardless of the
Form's sufficiency under Twombly and Iqbal.20 7
E. Other
Finally, some courts have favored an indistinct approach to
pleading after abrogation, using the bare principles of Twombly and
Iqbal to determine if pleadings are sufficient without any special
application to patent law.208
Although TC Heartland and the
abrogation of Form 18 suggest that patent litigation does not receive
special treatment, 209 continuing to permit multiple pleading standards
creates unnecessary subjectivity, resulting in confusion for plaintiffs
that could be easily resolved with a uniform pleading standard for
patent pleading. While the pleading sufficiency rate for this other
pleading standard is around 63 percent, 2 10 judges can easy utilize this
flexible pleading standard to appear more patent friendly. Though
Twombly is intended to be a flexible pleading standard, the data shows
this level of subjectivity creates confusion and inefficiency, resulting in
increased costs during the pleading stage. Further, the Federal
Circuit's adoption of the at least one claim pleading standard in cases
of simple technologies may call into question the sufficiency of this
generic approach. 211
To conclude, requiring a plaintiff to plead at least one claim of
every asserted patent in an infringement claim regardless of the
technology at issue provides the best uniform pleading standard going
forward. This pleading standard does not place undue burden on
plaintiffs, provides defendants sufficient notice of the issues in dispute,
and restricts frivolous suits brought by patent trolls. At the same time,
the pleading standard is not devoid of sufficient factual detail as to run
afoul of Twombly, increases predictability for both parties in the
pleading stage, and restricts the ability of judges to subjectively
influence the result of a motion to dismiss.
It should be noted that even if a uniform pleading standard is
applied, this would not create a rigid rule that would be too inflexible
to adapt to fact-specific situations that arise during the pleading stage.
207.
See Prime Focus Creative Servs. Canada, Inc. v. Legend3D, Inc., No.
CV15234OMWFPIAX, 2016 WL 6678009, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2016).
208.
See, e.g., Solocron Educ., LLC v. Healthstream, Inc., No. 2:16-CV-16-JRG, 2016 WL
9137458, at *3 (E.D. Tex. June 7, 2016).
209.
See TC Heartland, LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands, LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514, 1520 (2017)
("The current version of § 1391 does not contain any indication that Congress intended to alter the
meaning of § 1400(b) as interpreted in Fourco.").
See supra Section III.B.
210.
211.
Disc Disease Sols., Inc. v. VGH Sols., Inc., 888 F.3d 1256, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2018).

2019]1

POLITICIZEDPATENT PLEADING

775

Rather, under the at least one claim pleading standard, judges retain
the ability to decide what facts are necessary to sufficiently plead
infringement of at least one claim in the patent, which will vary in each
case based on the specific technology and circumstances surrounding
each suit.2 12

V. CONCLUSION
The 2015 Advisory Committee notes state that the purposes for
which FRCP 84 was enacted, namely to indicate the "simplicity and
brevity of statement[s] which the rules contemplate," have been fulfilled
and the forms "are no longer necessary." 213 However the behavior from
courts and plaintiffs during the last two years suggests plaintiffs and
courts are lost without FRCP 84 and Form 18. In the void left by the
abrogation of Form 18, district courts have implemented a wide range
of standards to assess pleading sufficiency under Twombly and Iqbal
that have confused plaintiffs and delayed trials. With many complaints
often being dismissed without prejudice, the Federal Circuit has had
few opportunities to resolve this divide between the district courts. 2 1 4
A review of two years of FRCP 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss since
the abrogation of Rule 84 indicates a higher rate of dismissals, which
has created inefficiency as plaintiffs often file several amended
complaints. 2 15 Analysis of these motions indicates a politically driven
divide among judges, with Republican appointees more likely to favor
strict pleading standards and subsequently granting motions to dismiss
significantly more than judges appointed by Democratic presidents.
This result is somewhat surprising as Republicans traditionally favor
strong private property rights but have often ruled against plaintiffs
asserting their patents in these decisions.
A modified version of the at least one claim pleading standard
would provide much needed clarity to this situation. This pleading
standard would require plaintiffs to sufficiently plead each element of
at least one claim of the infringed patent, regardless of technology,

212.
See MACOM Tech. Sol. Holdings, Inc. v. Infineon Techs. AG, No. 2:16-CV-02859-CAS,
2017 WL 3449596, at *5 (C.D. Cal. June 5, 2017) ("Where the subject patent is 'a relatively simple,
mechanical product,' plaintiff may plausibly allege infringement based only upon the patent claims
themselves and an image of the accused product. 'In a more complex, unusual case, the minimal
approach might not establish a plausible allegation of direct infringement." (citation omitted)).
FED. R. CIV. P. 84 advisory committee's note to 2015 abrogation (2015) (abrogated
213.
2015).
214.
See supra Section IIA.
See, e.g., Artrip v. Ball Corp., No. 1:14CV00014, 2017 WL 3669518, at *5 (W.D. Va.
215.
Aug. 24, 2017) (granting motion to dismiss but permitting plaintiff to file a third amended
complaint).
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while allowing other claims within the same patent to be pled with
lesser specificity. This pleading standard complies with the Supreme
Court's pleading jurisprudence in Twombly and Iqbal by requiring a
plausible claim for relief that puts the defendant on notice of
infringement allegations, without placing an undue burden on the
plaintiff at the pleading stage. Additionally, this pleading standard
creates a barrier to entry for patent trolls while not being so strict as to
deter meritorious suits. Regardless of which pleading standard is
eventually chosen, the data suggests a single pleading standard is
required that clarifies pleading for plaintiffs and provides flexibility for
judges. With a single pleading standard, courts may finally be able to
agree that the purposes of FRCP 84 have been fulfilled and that Form
18 is truly no longer necessary.

Nick Baniel*

J.D. Candidate, Vanderbilt University Law School, 2019; M.S., University of
Wisconsin-Madison 2013; B.S., University of Wisconsin-Madison 2012. I would like to thank
everyone that contributed to this Note, my education, and most importantly my mental health
over the past two years, however some deserve special recognition: To the JETFam, especially its
senior leadership: thank you for your countless hours of research, editing, and suggestions, and
for keeping morale high during this project-I can only imagine what you all would have
accomplished without my distractions; To the attorneys and professors that offered insights and
guidance: thank you for inspiring this foray into academic research; To my roommates at 1024
Mallet: thank you for the emotional support last summer when this Note hit its low point; Finally,
to my family: thank you for your unwavering love and patience throughout an exhausting yet
rewarding educational career. Your support never ceases to amaze me.

